atom feed39 messages in org.freebsd.freebsd-archRe: making the snoop device loadable.
FromSent OnAttachments
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 12:04 am 
AdamJul 9, 2000 1:19 am 
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 3:33 am 
AdamJul 9, 2000 6:25 am 
Daniel C. SobralJul 9, 2000 6:52 am 
Boris PopovJul 9, 2000 7:20 am 
AdamJul 9, 2000 10:45 am 
Poul-Henning KampJul 9, 2000 10:49 am 
Wilko BulteJul 9, 2000 10:59 am 
AdamJul 9, 2000 11:12 am 
Poul-Henning KampJul 9, 2000 11:16 am 
AdamJul 9, 2000 11:56 am 
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 12:06 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 12:35 pm 
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 1:13 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 1:19 pm 
John BaldwinJul 9, 2000 1:24 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 1:25 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 1:30 pm 
John BaldwinJul 9, 2000 1:34 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 2:56 pm 
John BaldwinJul 9, 2000 3:08 pm 
Doug BartonJul 9, 2000 4:39 pm 
Marius BendiksenJul 9, 2000 4:40 pm 
Marius BendiksenJul 9, 2000 4:45 pm 
Marius BendiksenJul 9, 2000 4:47 pm 
Marius BendiksenJul 9, 2000 4:53 pm 
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 4:56 pm 
Jeroen C. van GelderenJul 9, 2000 5:36 pm 
Jeroen C. van GelderenJul 9, 2000 5:38 pm 
Jeroen C. van GelderenJul 9, 2000 5:44 pm 
Alfred PerlsteinJul 9, 2000 6:02 pm 
Mike SmithJul 9, 2000 8:27 pm 
Mike SmithJul 9, 2000 8:35 pm 
AdamJul 9, 2000 9:06 pm 
Dag-Erling SmorgravJul 10, 2000 12:08 am 
Peter WemmJul 10, 2000 1:01 am 
Andrzej BialeckiJul 10, 2000 3:36 am 
Bruce EvansJul 10, 2000 4:48 am 
Subject:Re: making the snoop device loadable.
From:Adam (bs@looksharp.net)
Date:Jul 9, 2000 1:19:37 am
List:org.freebsd.freebsd-arch

On Sun, 9 Jul 2000, Alfred Perlstein wrote:

Ok, I noticed that with a bit of hacking the snp device can be made loadable. Making it unloadable is a bit of a pain, but I can implement it using refcounting on the amount of ttys that have snp devices hooked onto them so that the machine doesn't panic if you unload it.

The 'problem' that happens is that kern/tty.c now needs to include snoop.h unconditionally, and it also has to provide some exernally visible pointers to functions for the loadable snoop device to hook into.

Basically, does anyone have a problem with snp becoming loadable before I commit to finishing off the work? (it's loadable now, but not unloadable).

Would it make sense to have a kernel option or something to disable this feature without using securelevels? I'm thinking of the situation of the owner of a computer is paranoid (or highly ethical) and strongly dislikes the snooping ability yet other root users on the machine might not have the same standards and try to sneak in a module to peek around quick or cause trouble with other users. As it is now you would have to cause quite a commotion by at least rebooting the machine...

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