32 messages in net.sourceforge.lists.courier-maildrop[maildropl] Re: OpenBSD 3.2 breaks Co...
FromSent OnAttachments
Sam VarshavchikJan 13, 2003 3:46 pm 
D. J. BernsteinJan 13, 2003 6:11 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 13, 2003 9:11 pm 
Russell NelsonJan 13, 2003 9:46 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 13, 2003 10:19 pm 
Russell NelsonJan 13, 2003 11:11 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 13, 2003 11:35 pm 
mw-l...@csi.huJan 14, 2003 7:40 am 
Sam VarshavchikJan 14, 2003 3:22 pm 
mw-l...@csi.huJan 14, 2003 11:13 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 15, 2003 5:11 am 
Matthias AndreeJan 15, 2003 9:55 am 
Matthias AndreeJan 15, 2003 12:59 pm 
Matthias AndreeJan 15, 2003 1:36 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 15, 2003 3:11 pm 
Matthias AndreeJan 15, 2003 4:13 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 15, 2003 4:47 pm 
Johan LindhJan 15, 2003 10:16 pm 
Peter C. NortonJan 15, 2003 11:52 pm 
Bill MichellJan 16, 2003 1:30 am 
Johan LindhJan 16, 2003 2:00 am 
Bill MichellJan 16, 2003 2:28 am 
Matthias AndreeJan 16, 2003 2:28 am 
Matthias AndreeJan 16, 2003 2:45 am 
David LaightJan 16, 2003 3:14 am 
Sam VarshavchikJan 16, 2003 5:01 am 
Johan LindhJan 16, 2003 6:28 am 
Matthias AndreeJan 16, 2003 9:47 am 
mw-l...@csi.huJan 16, 2003 12:48 pm 
Sam VarshavchikJan 16, 2003 2:55 pm 
mw-l...@csi.huJan 17, 2003 12:30 pm 
Matthias AndreeJan 18, 2003 5:05 am 
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Subject:[maildropl] Re: OpenBSD 3.2 breaks Courier, Qmail.Actions...
From:Sam Varshavchik (mrs@courier-mta.com)
Date:Jan 13, 2003 11:35:41 pm
List:net.sourceforge.lists.courier-maildrop

Russell Nelson writes:

one Maildir dir will be unique in all of them." Other bits of code assume that "No pid will be reused in the same second".

This will end up affecting much more stuff. Plenty of code relies on the combination of pid_t+time_t being a locally-unique ID.

Now, what I don't understand is this. This is supposed to be all about sooper, dooper, security, right? Now, I don't see how monotonically increasing pids have any security-related issues, unless there's already an existing, potential, exploit; an existing defect somewhere else which can be used, in conjunction with monotonical pids, to manufacture a exploitable race condition.

Now, there's nothing wrong with using a random pid generator to minimize the possibility of generating an exploitable race condition. Nothing wrong at all.

Except that, it seems to me now, having different processes sharing the same pid within such a short period of time would certainly now create exploitable race conditions of their very own.

So you're not really getting anything of value at all. You're merely replacing one potential race condition, with another one. So what exactly did we accomplish, here?