The requirements subcommittee is considering what the requirements should be for a timestamp format and protocol. We'd like some input from the group, since this hasn't had much discussion yet.

Currently, the notions of time-marked signatures and time-stamped signatures have been defined:

A time-marked signature is just a signature on some content with a signed attribute (created by the signer) containing the signing time.

A time-stamped signature contains, as an unsigned attribute, a timestamp "token", which somehow binds the time and a hash of the time-stamped signature's signatureValue, and is created and signed by a 3rd party TSA (Time Stamp Authority).

More generally, a timestamp token may be used to timestamp other things than a signatureValue.

Now, whatever format the timestamp token takes, a timestamp protocol just requires the client send a hash and receive back a token. This shouldn't be any different from the DSS protocol used in the "client-side hashing" and "receiving a detached signature" case. Thus, time-stamping should just be a use-case of the DSS protocol, not a separate protocol.

As for an XML timestamp token format, there's two approaches: A) Define a time-stamp token as just a time-marked signature produced by a 3rd-party that's trusted as a TSA. B) Define a time-stamp token as a signature on some new <TSTInfo> structure containing a hash of the to-be-timestamped data and the time.

In (A), the TSA produces a normal signature using the hash of the to-be-timestamped data, with time as a signed attribute. In (B), the TSA combines the hash of the to-be-timestamped data with the time into a new structure, and produces a normal signature on that. (B) is the approach used in RFC 3161, which is PKIX's timestamping protocol, and is used to timestamp CMS signatures.

The benefit of (A) is that timestamps aren't handled differently from any other signature type, they're just a particular "semantics" instead of "syntax". The argument against this, is that timestamps *are* different from other signatures: Normally signatures testify that the contents are associated with the signer as an originating entity, not that the contents are associated with a time. So timestamps should have a different syntax to ensure that they're processed correctly, and that a Relying Party understands that the time is the important thing, and doesn't mistakenly ignore a signing-time signed attribute and think the TSA originated the to-be-signed data.

One way of framing the question: what are the semantics of a raw, DSIG signature? If a DSIG signature is just a statement of the form "someone says something about some data", where - the speaker ("someone") is identified with a <KeyInfo> - the object ("some data") is identified with a <SignedInfo> - the predicate (what is being said about the object) is identified by the <KeyInfo>'s properties/policy identifiers and signed attributes

Then asserting that the data existed at a certain time is just another predicate that can be asserted about <SignedInfo>, along with asserting that you originated it, or asserting that you agree to its contents, or asserting that it really came from some Identified Requestor.

But if a DSIG signature also carries the semantics that the signer originated the data, then it would be misleading for a TSA to produce a signature on the to-be-timestamped hash while relegating the signing time to a signed attribute (but then wouldn't any use case where the server didn't originate the data, but just signed a hash, be misleading?).

But that may be unfair (I'm biased towards A). What do other people prefer?

Trevor