atom feed63 messages in org.oasis-open.lists.dssRE: [dss] Groups - dss-requirements-1...
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robe...@entrust.comMar 24, 2003 12:58 pm 
Gregor KarlingerMar 25, 2003 7:34 am.bin
Trevor PerrinMar 25, 2003 11:30 am 
Nick PopeMar 25, 2003 11:35 am 
Nick PopeMar 25, 2003 12:23 pm 
Trevor PerrinMar 25, 2003 12:29 pm 
Trevor PerrinMar 25, 2003 12:33 pm 
jmessingMar 25, 2003 12:36 pm 
Trevor PerrinMar 25, 2003 1:18 pm 
Nick PopeMar 25, 2003 1:21 pm 
Nick PopeMar 25, 2003 1:21 pm 
Nick PopeMar 26, 2003 1:21 am 
kare...@esat.kuleuven.ac.beMar 26, 2003 4:02 am 
Nick PopeMar 26, 2003 5:22 am 
jmessingMar 26, 2003 5:26 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 26, 2003 10:49 am 
jmessingMar 26, 2003 10:57 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 26, 2003 11:11 am 
Rich SalzMar 26, 2003 11:24 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 26, 2003 1:15 pm 
Greg AlvordMar 27, 2003 4:37 am 
Gregor KarlingerMar 27, 2003 9:01 am.bin
Trevor PerrinMar 27, 2003 1:17 pm 
Nick PopeMar 28, 2003 3:54 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 28, 2003 1:52 pm 
Nick PopeMar 29, 2003 9:35 am 
Rich SalzMar 29, 2003 10:10 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 29, 2003 10:14 am 
Rich SalzMar 29, 2003 10:36 am 
jmessingMar 29, 2003 11:19 am 
Rich SalzMar 29, 2003 11:26 am 
Trevor PerrinMar 29, 2003 11:46 am 
jmessingMar 29, 2003 12:31 pm 
Rich SalzMar 29, 2003 3:35 pm 
Trevor PerrinMar 30, 2003 1:49 am 
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 10:50 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:07 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:18 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:23 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:31 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:47 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:58 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 12:14 pm.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 12:23 pm.bin
Rich SalzMar 30, 2003 2:25 pm 
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:14 pm.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:20 pm.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:26 pm.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:30 pm.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 30, 2003 11:37 pm.bin
Trevor PerrinMar 31, 2003 1:41 am 
Gregor KarlingerMar 31, 2003 1:48 am.bin
Gregor KarlingerMar 31, 2003 1:56 am.bin
Nick PopeMar 31, 2003 4:02 am 
Anthony NadalinMar 31, 2003 5:15 am 
Karel WoutersMar 31, 2003 6:30 am 
Gregor KarlingerMar 31, 2003 7:22 am.bin
Trevor PerrinMar 31, 2003 8:46 am 
Gregor KarlingerMar 31, 2003 1:20 pm.bin
Nick PopeApr 1, 2003 1:32 am 
Karel WoutersApr 1, 2003 2:52 am 
Nick PopeApr 1, 2003 2:52 am 
Nick PopeApr 1, 2003 3:03 am 
Subject:RE: [dss] Groups - dss-requirements-1.0-draft-02.doc uploaded
From:Nick Pope (po@secstan.com)
Date:Mar 25, 2003 12:23:13 pm
List:org.oasis-open.lists.dss

Trevor,

I support Gregor's use case is realistic need. There are situations where the same data is required to be human readbale and machine processible, for example my tax return which I want to keep a printed copy and also submit it to the IRS / Inland Revenue for processing. It is easier to prove that the IRS processed what I saw if the human displayed version and the machine processed version both are produced from the same raw XML. The style sheet used also needs to be signed though.

Nick

-----Original Message----- From: Trevor Perrin [mailto:tre@trevp.net] Sent: 25 March 2003 19:38 To: Gregor Karlinger; robe@entrust.com Cc: ML OASIS DSS Subject: RE: [dss] Groups - dss-requirements-1.0-draft-02.doc uploaded

At 04:43 PM 3/25/2003 +0100, Gregor Karlinger wrote:

Robert & Trevor,

I would like to make a clarification regarding the use case "Securing The Transform Chain" I have submitted to the group:

It seems that in the requirements draft there is a mix up of two different stories:

1. The use case "Securing The Transform Chain" (which has been the first part of my message "Use cases and requirements input" sent to the list on Wed, 15 Jan 2003 [1].

2. A collection of requirements regarding digital signature services in general (which comprise the second part of that message).

Okay. I think all your general requirements are incorporated into section 3, in various places. So we should change 2.7 to just mention the particular aspects of your use case. I have a question about the use case, though:

You mention using transforms to make XML data human readable (by turning it into HTML, say), and then signing the XML data along with the transforms, so the relying party can reconstruct exactly what the signer saw when he was signing.

But then the XML data isn't really signed, so the relying party can't do anything with the XML itself - the transform might have turned the XML into something completely different. So if all this accomplishes is transmitting signed HTML, why not just send signed HTML in the first place?

It seems that, if you want the relying party to process XML, the XML itself needs to be signed, not a transformed, human-readable version of it. Presenting the to-be-signed data to the signer in an agreeable format is the problem of the signer's application software.

Now if that software wanted to add a signed attribute containing the HTML, or some transforms on the XML, to specify "this is what the signer actually saw", that might be a good idea, and could be used to resolve disputes about the signer's intent. Should we modify the use case to something like that?