| From | Sent On | Attachments |
|---|---|---|
| Brice Figureau | Jul 21, 2009 11:01 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 1:43 am | |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 3:21 am | |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 4:39 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 5:15 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 7:52 am | .optional |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 10:15 am | |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 10:20 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 11:38 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 11:42 am | |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 12:13 pm | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 22, 2009 12:23 pm | |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 22, 2009 2:17 pm | |
| Tom Keyser | Jul 22, 2009 5:50 pm | |
| Glen Lumanau | Jul 22, 2009 5:59 pm | |
| Edward Middleton | Jul 22, 2009 7:26 pm | |
| Cliff Wells | Jul 22, 2009 8:22 pm | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 23, 2009 12:08 am | |
| Igor Sysoev | Jul 23, 2009 12:56 am | .crl |
| Brice Figureau | Jul 23, 2009 4:32 am |
| Subject: | Re: New SSL features for Nginx. | |
|---|---|---|
| From: | Brice Figureau (bric...@daysofwonder.com) | |
| Date: | Jul 22, 2009 12:13:32 pm | |
| List: | ru.sysoev.nginx | |
On 22/07/09 20:43, Igor Sysoev wrote:
On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 07:20:39PM +0200, Brice Figureau wrote:
On 22/07/09 14:16, Igor Sysoev wrote:
On Wed, Jul 22, 2009 at 12:21:23PM +0200, Brice Figureau wrote:
Hi Igor,
On Wed, 2009-07-22 at 12:44 +0400, Igor Sysoev wrote:
On Tue, Jul 21, 2009 at 08:02:05PM +0200, Brice Figureau wrote:
Hi,
For Puppet[1] Nginx deployement (that is using Nginx as a front-end load-balancers to puppetmasters[2]), I had to create the following two patches, to match Apache behaviour:
* The first patch allows: + a new variant of ssl_client_verify: optional. In this mode, if the client sends a certificate it is verified, but if the client doesn't send a certificate, the connection is authorized too.
+ a new variable: $ssl_client_verify which contains, either NONE, SUCCESS or FAILURE depending on the verification status. It can be used to send information to the upstream about the client verification.
* The second patch adds CRL support to the client certificate verification:
ssl_crl /path/to/crl.pem;
Nginx then verifies the client certificate hasn't been revoked in the given CRL before allowing the connection to proceed.
For access to the patches, please see my last blog article: http://www.masterzen.fr/2009/07/21/new-ssl-features-for-nginx/
It would be great if those patches could be merged in the official Nginx source tree.
Thank you, I have looked the patches, it was really surpise for me that OpenSSL 0.9.7 supports CRL. I read in old enough book "Network Security with OpenSSL" written when 0.9.7 was being developed, that OpenSSL has no built-in CRL support.
Ah, ok. I based all my development on OpenSSL 0.9.8, since that's what I'm building Nginx againt. And definitely there is CRL support. Is OpenSSL 0.9.7 a strict dependency for Nginx?
No. I think this code should be just "#ifdef'ed X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK".
I'm OK with this. BTW, I checked and CRL support was added in 0.9.7.
Then I have looked in Apache's mod_ssl sources and its CRL support seemed to me very heavy: mod_ssl does a lot of useless operations.
Which ones? What I don't get is why they're doing the CRL verification themselves.
Because mod_ssl were developed before 0.9.7.
Yes, I do think so. But it's error-prone and certainly less efficient.
I found this comment in the code: * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
This seems wrong to me, as I already tested, and it works fine at least in version 0.9.8.
Yes, this implementation. However, I made mistake: it's not too heavy as it seemed to me first time I have looked.
I think that it's enough to store hash of only public key of all CRL certificates (including intermediate ones).
Why reinvent the wheel? The CRL is a standard thing (see RFC 3280), and basically this is a DER encoded ASN1 structure containing the list of the revoked certificates serial number, signed by the CA cert.
Have you looked how CRL is implemented in OpenSSL ?
Yes, I did. It is pretty extensive, and matches RFC3280.
I'll fetch OpenSSL 0.9.7 to see if it supports or not CRL, but I'd be suprised it wouldn't.
0.9.7 definitely supports CRL verification.
Yes. When I mentioned the book, I meant that CRL were not supported at least in 0.9.6.
Thanks for reviewing the patch (at least the first one could be merged, isn't it?).
Probabaly, I will commit the patches in next 0.8.7.
Will you merge the CRL one (feel free to rewrite it if you prefer), too ?
Yes, the single issue is name of directive: ssl_crl. Should it be longer and more expressive ? Apache has SSLCARevocationFile.
Yes, the name is not very good but the other alternatives I thought about were too long: ssl_certificate_revocation ssl_ca_revocation ssl_ca_certificate_revocation
Maybe the best one is: ssl_ca_revocation? But that'd be the only directive with CA in it, although that's what's is really the ssl_client_certificate one.
So maybe, last try: ssl_client_revocation would be really better.
What do you think?
-- Brice Figureau My Blog: http://www.masterzen.fr/






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