atom feed31 messages in org.oasis-open.lists.officeRe: [office] Digital Signature proposal
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Jomar SilvaJul 11, 2008 9:59 am 
Bob JolliffeJul 12, 2008 7:09 am 
robe...@us.ibm.comJul 13, 2008 12:12 pm 
Duane NickullJul 13, 2008 12:35 pm 
Bob JolliffeJul 27, 2008 1:27 pm 
Ming Fei JiaJul 30, 2008 4:02 am.gif, .gif, .gif, 8 more
Bob JolliffeJul 30, 2008 4:52 am 
Jomar SilvaJul 30, 2008 9:01 am 
Duane NickullJul 30, 2008 9:13 am 
Dave PawsonJul 30, 2008 9:40 am 
Duane NickullJul 30, 2008 9:51 am 
Dave PawsonJul 30, 2008 10:28 am 
Duane NickullJul 30, 2008 10:49 am 
Ming Fei JiaJul 31, 2008 9:17 am.gif, .gif, .gif, 13 more
Dave PawsonJul 31, 2008 9:56 am 
Jomar SilvaJul 31, 2008 10:32 am 
Bob JolliffeJul 31, 2008 10:42 am 
Dave PawsonJul 31, 2008 11:41 am 
Duane NickullJul 31, 2008 11:47 am 
robe...@us.ibm.comJul 31, 2008 2:43 pm 
Duane NickullJul 31, 2008 2:54 pm 
Jomar SilvaJul 31, 2008 3:15 pm 
Duane NickullJul 31, 2008 3:32 pm 
Ming Fei JiaJul 31, 2008 10:53 pm.gif, .gif, .gif, 6 more
Dee SchurAug 1, 2008 7:05 am 
Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - HamburgAug 8, 2008 5:57 am 
Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - HamburgAug 8, 2008 6:06 am 
Dave PawsonAug 8, 2008 6:11 am 
Bob JolliffeAug 8, 2008 7:06 am 
Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - HamburgAug 11, 2008 4:49 am 
Bob JolliffeAug 12, 2008 12:57 am 
Subject:Re: [office] Digital Signature proposal
From:Duane Nickull (dnic@adobe.com)
Date:Jul 30, 2008 9:51:21 am
List:org.oasis-open.lists.office

Dave:

The PDF archive format can preserve a block of bytes representing the original document plus the signature dictionary which contains information about the hashing algorithm, the key and signature values in a manner that they can be preserved and tested in the future. The exact mechanism is very complex and includes callback to test as the file is being written out to disk to ensure no tampering occurred between the time it was signed and the persistence to disk as well as other safeguards.

The PDF itself could be signed again thus making two certification events per document. Multiple signatures on a document have extra complexity as you first have to certify documents. It basically works on a function v(function v(function v()))... Basis. The second signature or certification event includes the bytes used by the first set of signatures.

Based on currently acceptable algorithms and historic CPU breakthroughs, I would suspect that what people use today for Dsig is not what will be acceptable tomorrow for things like certifying documents.

I have a set of PDF slides on the PDF signature mechanism if anyone wants to understand this in more detail.

Duane

On 30/07/08 9:41 AM, "Dave Pawson" <dave@gmail.com> wrote:

2008/7/30 Duane Nickull <dnic@adobe.com>:

On this topic, has anyone on this TC covered cross-standard workflows to determine requirements? A typical request is to take an ODF doc and archive it in PDF format. Ensuring the dSig info can be archived in a format that it will still be capable of being authenticated 50 years from now is a hot topic with lots of governments.

Highly unlikely. The signature is based on a specific instance (say the content.xml file in office). Why should we expect it to survive a transform into PDF, back out of it, then remain valid?

The ODF and PDF instances are different documents. Hence the signature should be invalidated IMO

regards