| From | Sent On | Attachments |
|---|---|---|
| Patrick Durusau | Nov 27, 2006 4:51 pm | |
| David Faure | Nov 28, 2006 1:07 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 1:40 am | .pgp |
| Florian Reuter | Nov 28, 2006 2:32 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 2:51 am | .pgp |
| Dave Pawson | Nov 28, 2006 2:58 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 3:12 am | .pgp |
| Patrick Durusau | Nov 28, 2006 3:30 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 6:29 am | .pgp |
| Patrick Durusau | Nov 28, 2006 6:47 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 6:59 am | .pgp |
| robe...@us.ibm.com | Nov 28, 2006 7:37 am | |
| Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - Hamburg | Nov 28, 2006 7:42 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 28, 2006 8:16 am | .pgp |
| Patrick Durusau | Nov 28, 2006 11:07 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Nov 29, 2006 1:07 am | .pgp |
| Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - Hamburg | Dec 8, 2006 2:50 am | |
| Daniel Carrera | Dec 8, 2006 3:54 am | .pgp |
| Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - Hamburg | Dec 8, 2006 4:18 am | |
| Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - Hamburg | Jan 15, 2007 2:24 am | |
| Zhi Yu Yue | Jan 15, 2007 6:19 am | |
| Michael Brauer - Sun Germany - ham02 - Hamburg | Jan 15, 2007 6:36 am |
| Subject: | Re: [office] Passwords | |
|---|---|---|
| From: | Daniel Carrera (dani...@zmsl.com) | |
| Date: | Nov 28, 2006 1:40:27 am | |
| List: | org.oasis-open.lists.office | |
| Attachments: | ![]() pgp00000.pgp - 0.3k | |
On Tue, 2006-28-11 at 10:08 +0100, David Faure wrote:
On Tue Nov 28 2006, Patrick Durusau wrote:
Shouldn't encryption of the password be considered as application specific?
This would simply kill interoperability. Why don't we standardize the hash
function instead?
Or provide a short list of acceptable hash functions. For example: SHA1, SHA256 and SHA512.
I'm a tad hesitant about SHA1 because it's been "broken", but only for finding collisions:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html
So, you shouldn't use SHA1 for digital signatures, but AFAICT it's still perfectly good for encryption and password purposes where you are not looking for collisions but a pre-image.
The reason I suggest a list is that not everyone might want to use SHA512 for their passwords, as it's over-kill, but we shouldn't disallow people who do want to use SHA512.
Cheers, Daniel.
-- "I AM in shape. Round IS a shape."






.pgp