30 messages in com.xensource.lists.xen-develRe: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][ACM] kernel e...
FromSent OnAttachments
Bryan D. Payne24 Jul 2006 09:23.diff
Keir Fraser24 Jul 2006 10:28 
Bryan D Payne24 Jul 2006 13:09 
Reiner Sailer24 Jul 2006 17:20 
Keir Fraser25 Jul 2006 02:52 
Bryan D Payne25 Jul 2006 10:45 
Steven Hand25 Jul 2006 11:48 
Mike D. Day26 Jul 2006 06:25 
Keir Fraser26 Jul 2006 06:49 
Reiner Sailer26 Jul 2006 08:47 
Mike D. Day26 Jul 2006 10:45 
Keir Fraser26 Jul 2006 11:06 
Mike D. Day26 Jul 2006 11:23 
Andrew Warfield26 Jul 2006 11:49 
Reiner Sailer26 Jul 2006 14:21 
Harry Butterworth26 Jul 2006 15:22 
Reiner Sailer26 Jul 2006 15:51 
Andrew Warfield26 Jul 2006 16:04 
Harry Butterworth26 Jul 2006 18:40 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 02:41 
Reiner Sailer27 Jul 2006 08:37 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 09:26 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 09:36 
Reiner Sailer27 Jul 2006 09:58 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 10:06 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 10:18 
Reiner Sailer27 Jul 2006 10:38 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 10:43 
Reiner Sailer27 Jul 2006 10:52 
Harry Butterworth27 Jul 2006 11:37 
Subject:Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][ACM] kernel enforcement of vbd policies via blkback driver
From:Steven Hand (Stev@cl.cam.ac.uk)
Date:07/25/2006 11:48:09 AM
List:com.xensource.lists.xen-devel

The tools hook is not just a usability/conformity check. The check ensures that the tools will not set up entries in xenstore that would allow blkback to create a non-conformant vbd. So there is no way for a guest to trick blkback into creating a non-conformant vbd: it can only connect to vbds specified in its config file or added later via the vbd-add xm hotplug command. The tools stack should perform its compiance checks on both 'xm create' and 'xm vbd-add', and that should be sufficient.

My concern is that security is now relying on the correctness of all code that can write to the xenstore. The quantity of code that does this will likely continue to grow, and even include third party tools. If any of this code attachs a vbd to a domain without performing a security check, then the security would be bypassed.

There still a major dependency on xenstore; it's pretty much part of the TCB at present. I know some folks have been thinking about how to 'secure' it more comprehensively while allowing integration with whatever ACM policy is in force. I think this is a more promising approach than an ad hoc extra check in blkback.

cheers,

S.