10 messages in net.sourceforge.lists.courier-maildropRe: [maildropl] segregate non-whiteli...
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email builderSep 4, 2008 2:52 pm 
email builderSep 4, 2008 3:32 pm 
Sam VarshavchikSep 4, 2008 3:32 pm 
email builderSep 4, 2008 4:46 pm 
moussSep 5, 2008 2:38 pm 
email builderSep 7, 2008 2:51 pm 
email builderSep 7, 2008 2:59 pm 
Sam VarshavchikSep 7, 2008 3:12 pm 
email builderSep 7, 2008 5:28 pm 
Devin RubiaSep 8, 2008 8:01 am 
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Subject:Re: [maildropl] segregate non-whitelisted mails?Actions...
From:Sam Varshavchik (mrs@courier-mta.com)
Date:Sep 4, 2008 3:32:55 pm
List:net.sourceforge.lists.courier-maildrop

email builder writes:

2) The kicker is that I want all other (non-whitelisted senders) mail to be
filtered elsewhere. I think if I can come up with a maildrop script that
accomplishes #1 above, this may not be too hard, but I am concerned about two
things:

a) Reading in a (possibly big) whitelist from a file or database during
maildrop execution may not be efficient(?) and may be hard to code in maildrop
script language

There are some filtering statements that are geared towards this situation, see the lookup() function in the maildropfilter man page. It's going to be as fast as reading a list of regular expressions from a file, and applying them.

b) The FROM header is easily forged -- can I rely on typical postfix EHLO and client checks (such as requiring the client domain to match the sender domain or whatever) to catch those forgeries and safely be naive/trusting of what the FROM header says if I implement this in maildrop? Even if this kind of filtering was implemented elsewhere, it'd still have to be based on the FROM header, so maybe this question becomes irrelevant except to know how much postfix rules can help make the FROM header trustable....??

This is true, but you are using a whitelist-based approach. For your approach to be defeated, the attacker has to know exactly what addresses you are whitelisting. Forging a random address on the From: header won't help -- the forged address is unlikely to be whitelisted.